Would Enterprises Send Food Traceability Information to Consumers? release_zsfdrnbourhwdi35rtse6unhim

by Wu Tianzhen, Wang Ruimei, Hu Hongwei, Song Huan

Published in Journal of Food Research by Canadian Center of Science and Education.

2014   p105

Abstract

Food security incidents have enhanced Chinese consumers' concerns about food quality and security. These growing concerns have increased demand for security of food and led to development of Chinese food traceability system. Based on the literature review, this paper built a signaling dynamic game model of information delivery from enterprises to consumers to explore the refining Bayes Nash equilibrium. The analytical results show that "good" enterprise need to send enough food traceability information to get themselves separated from "bad" enterprises, while enterprises which were "not that good" had to send much more information to achieve that trust of consumers.
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Date   2014-11-30
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