NeuroHammer: Inducing Bit-Flips in Memristive Crossbar Memories
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by
Felix Staudigl, Hazem Al Indari, Daniel Schön, Dominik Sisejkovic, Farhad Merchant, Jan Moritz Joseph, Vikas Rana, Stephan Menzel, Rainer Leupers
2021
Abstract
Emerging non-volatile memory (NVM) technologies offer unique advantages in
energy efficiency, latency, and features such as computing-in-memory.
Consequently, emerging NVM technologies are considered an ideal substrate for
computation and storage in future-generation neuromorphic platforms. These
technologies need to be evaluated for fundamental reliability and security
issues. In this paper, we present NeuroHammer, a security threat in
ReRAM crossbars caused by thermal crosstalk between memory cells. We
demonstrate that bit-flips can be deliberately induced in ReRAM devices in a
crossbar by systematically writing adjacent memory cells. A simulation flow is
developed to evaluate NeuroHammer and the impact of physical parameters on the
effectiveness of the attack. Finally, we discuss the security implications in
the context of possible attack scenarios.
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