Learning the Structure and Parameters of Large-Population Graphical
Games from Behavioral Data
release_ygackfbnjbarthzajcqxnmfsra
by
Jean Honorio, Luis Ortiz
2012
Abstract
We consider learning, from strictly behavioral data, the structure and
parameters of linear influence games (LIGs), a class of parametric graphical
games introduced by Irfan and Ortiz (2014). LIGs facilitate causal strategic
inference (CSI): Making inferences from causal interventions on stable behavior
in strategic settings. Applications include the identification of the most
influential individuals in large (social) networks. Such tasks can also support
policy-making analysis. Motivated by the computational work on LIGs, we cast
the learning problem as maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) of a generative
model defined by pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). Our simple formulation
uncovers the fundamental interplay between goodness-of-fit and model
complexity: good models capture equilibrium behavior within the data while
controlling the true number of equilibria, including those unobserved. We
provide a generalization bound establishing the sample complexity for MLE in
our framework. We propose several algorithms including convex loss minimization
(CLM) and sigmoidal approximations. We prove that the number of exact PSNE in
LIGs is small, with high probability; thus, CLM is sound. We illustrate our
approach on synthetic data and real-world U.S. congressional voting records. We
briefly discuss our learning framework's generality and potential applicability
to general graphical games.
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