Security proof for continuous-variable quantum key distribution with trusted hardware noise against general attacks release_xo7gi7chdrh2fo2moa63kkyrv4

by Roman Goncharov, Alexei D. Kiselev, Eduard Samsonov, Vladimir Egorov

Released as a article .

2022  

Abstract

In this paper, using the full security framework for continuous variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD), we provide a composable security proof for the CV-QKD system in a realistic implementation. We take into account equipment losses and contributions from various components of excess noise and evaluate performance against collective and coherent attacks assuming trusted hardware noise. The calculation showed that the system remains operable at channel losses up to 10.2 dB in the presence of collective attacks and up to 7.5 dB in the presence of coherent ones.
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Date   2022-05-11
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arXiv  2205.05299v1
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