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Security proof for continuous-variable quantum key distribution with trusted hardware noise against general attacks
release_xo7gi7chdrh2fo2moa63kkyrv4
by
Roman Goncharov, Alexei D. Kiselev, Eduard Samsonov, Vladimir Egorov
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as a article
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2022
Abstract
In this paper, using the full security framework for continuous variable
quantum key distribution (CV-QKD), we provide a composable security proof for
the CV-QKD system in a realistic implementation. We take into account equipment
losses and contributions from various components of excess noise and evaluate
performance against collective and coherent attacks assuming trusted hardware
noise. The calculation showed that the system remains operable at channel
losses up to 10.2 dB in the presence of collective attacks and up to 7.5 dB in
the presence of coherent ones.
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2205.05299v1
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