Almost Group Envy-free Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Chores release_slrzxvttvvazjphysb5ii5wla4

by Haris Aziz, Simon Rey

Published in International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence by International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization.

2020   p39-45

Abstract

We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting in which an agent's utility may decrease or increase when an item is allocated. We take the group envy-freeness concept that is well-established in the literature and present stronger and relaxed versions that are especially suitable for the allocation of indivisible items. Of particular interest is a concept called group envy-freeness up to one item (GEF1). We then present a clear taxonomy of the fairness concepts. We study which fairness concepts guarantee the existence of a fair allocation under which preference domain. For two natural classes of additive utilities, we design polynomial-time algorithms to compute a GEF1 allocation. We also prove that checking whether a given allocation satisfies GEF1 is coNP-complete when there are either only goods, only chores or both.
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