Fair allocation of indivisible goods under conflict constraints
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Nina Chiarelli, Matjaž Krnc, Martin Milanič, Ulrich Pferschy, Nevena Pivač, Joachim Schauer
2021
Abstract
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents and
add a graph theoretical perspective to this classical problem. Thereby we
introduce an incompatibility relation between pairs of items described in terms
of a conflict graph. Every subset of items assigned to one agent has to form an
independent set in this graph. Thus, the allocation of items to the agents
corresponds to a partial coloring of the conflict graph. Every agent has its
own profit valuation for every item. Aiming at a fair allocation, our goal is
the maximization of the lowest total profit of items allocated to any one of
the agents. The resulting optimization problem contains, as special cases, both
Partition and Independent Set. In our contribution we derive
complexity and algorithmic results depending on the properties of the given
graph. We can show that the problem is strongly NP-hard for bipartite graphs
and their line graphs, and solvable in pseudo-polynomial time for the classes
of chordal graphs, cocomparability graphs, biconvex bipartite graphs, and
graphs of bounded treewidth. Each of the pseudo-polynomial algorithms can also
be turned into a fully polynomial approximation scheme (FPTAS).
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