RFID Authentication Against an Unsecure Backend Server
release_l5tx4jcbc5hjrkjxvwkazhq3zi
by
Wei Xie, Chen Zhang, Quan Zhang, Chaojing Tang
2013
Abstract
This paper address a new problem in RFID authentication research for the
first time. That is, existing RFID authentication schemes generally assume that
the backend server is absolutely secure, however, this assumption is rarely
tenable in practical conditions. It disables existing RFID authentication
protocols from being safely applied to a reallife scenario in which the backend
server is actually vulnerable, compromised or even malicious itself. We propose
an RFID authentication scheme against an unsecure backend server. It is based
on hash chain, searching over encrypted data, and coprivacy, defending against
the privacy revealing to the backend server. The proposed scheme is scalable,
resistant to desynchronization attacks, and provides mutual authentication in
only three frontend communication steps. Moreover, it is the first scheme
meeting the special security and privacy requirement for a cloud-based RFID
authentication scenario in which the backend server is untrustworthy to readers
held by cloud clients.
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