Divine Simplicity, God's Freedom, and the Supposed Problem of Modal Collapse
release_ir4ajdpgqzdptffyjn42767axu
by
Daniel Pedersen, Christopher Lilley
Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>
Proponents of the modal collapse argument claim that divine simplicity, traditionally conceived, contradicts other Christian commitments about divine freedom and grace by ultimately rendering all God's acts, including creation and redemption, absolutely necessary. If true, the argument goes, theologians must abandon either God's simplicity or God's freedom. The aim of this dilemma is to force the abandonment of simplicity. However, we argue that the modal collapse argument is insufficient to generate this dilemma apart from additional premises—and that these tacit premises are the true locus of dispute.
In application/xml+jats
format
Archived Files and Locations
application/pdf 269.8 kB
file_htqihixizzcshfhdojrhez7l6i
|
brill.com (publisher) web.archive.org (webarchive) |
article-journal
Stage
published
Date 2022-04-08
access all versions, variants, and formats of this works (eg, pre-prints)
Crossref Metadata (via API)
Worldcat
SHERPA/RoMEO (journal policies)
wikidata.org
CORE.ac.uk
Semantic Scholar
Google Scholar