SoK: Arms Race in Adversarial Malware Detection release_ijpd6gdu6bcatcsirmbdjnnujy

by Deqiang Li, Qianmu Li, Yanfang Ye, Shouhuai Xu

Released as a article .

2020  

Abstract

Malicious software (malware) is a major cyber threat that shall be tackled with Machine Learning (ML) techniques because millions of new malware examples are injected into cyberspace on a daily basis. However, ML is known to be vulnerable to attacks known as adversarial examples. In this SoK paper, we systematize the field of Adversarial Malware Detection (AMD) through the lens of a unified framework of assumptions, attacks, defenses and security properties. This not only guides us to map attacks and defenses into some partial order structures, but also allows us to clearly describe the attack-defense arms race in the AMD context. In addition to manually drawing insights, we also propose using ML to draw insights from the systematized representation of the literature. Examples of the insights are: knowing the defender's feature set is critical to the attacker's success; attack tactic (as a core part of the threat model) largely determines what security property of a malware detector can be broke; there is currently no silver bullet defense against evasion attacks or poisoning attacks; defense tactic largely determines what security properties can be achieved by a malware detector; knowing attacker's manipulation set is critical to defender's success; ML is an effective method for insights learning in SoK studies. These insights shed light on future research directions.
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Date   2020-06-15
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arXiv  2005.11671v2
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