Bidding behavior in auctions versus posted prices: comparisons of mean and marginal effects release_hs3jwqzdhza3fnduchnea5b4hu

by Shang Wu, Jacob R. Fooks, Tongzhe Li, Kent Messer, Deborah A. Delaney

Published in Agricultural and Resource Economics Review by Cambridge University Press (CUP).

2021   p1-23

Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> Economic experiments have been widely used to elicit individuals' evaluation for various commodities. Common elicitation methods include auction and posted price mechanisms. A field experiment is designed to compare willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates between these two mechanisms. Despite both of these formats being theoretically incentive compatible and demand revealing, results from 115 adult consumers indicate that WTP estimates obtained from an auction are 32–39 percent smaller than those from a posted price mechanism. A comparison in statistical significance shows that auctions require a smaller sample size than posted price mechanisms in order to detect the same preference change. Nevertheless, the signs of marginal effects for different product characteristics are consistent in both mechanisms.
In application/xml+jats format

Archived Files and Locations

application/pdf  362.4 kB
file_zhppaevnwrgwpjcxtbuyad2e4q
www.cambridge.org (publisher)
web.archive.org (webarchive)
Read Archived PDF
Preserved and Accessible
Type  article-journal
Stage   published
Date   2021-04-07
Language   en ?
Container Metadata
Open Access Publication
In DOAJ
In ISSN ROAD
In Keepers Registry
ISSN-L:  1068-2805
Work Entity
access all versions, variants, and formats of this works (eg, pre-prints)
Catalog Record
Revision: 38749485-e37a-4a89-88d4-34a2307c155d
API URL: JSON