Bidding behavior in auctions versus posted prices: comparisons of mean and marginal effects
release_hs3jwqzdhza3fnduchnea5b4hu
by
Shang Wu, Jacob R. Fooks, Tongzhe Li, Kent Messer, Deborah A. Delaney
2021 p1-23
Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>
Economic experiments have been widely used to elicit individuals' evaluation for various commodities. Common elicitation methods include auction and posted price mechanisms. A field experiment is designed to compare willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates between these two mechanisms. Despite both of these formats being theoretically incentive compatible and demand revealing, results from 115 adult consumers indicate that WTP estimates obtained from an auction are 32–39 percent smaller than those from a posted price mechanism. A comparison in statistical significance shows that auctions require a smaller sample size than posted price mechanisms in order to detect the same preference change. Nevertheless, the signs of marginal effects for different product characteristics are consistent in both mechanisms.
In application/xml+jats
format
Archived Files and Locations
application/pdf 362.4 kB
file_zhppaevnwrgwpjcxtbuyad2e4q
|
www.cambridge.org (publisher) web.archive.org (webarchive) |
Open Access Publication
In DOAJ
In ISSN ROAD
In Keepers Registry
ISSN-L:
1068-2805
access all versions, variants, and formats of this works (eg, pre-prints)
Crossref Metadata (via API)
Worldcat
SHERPA/RoMEO (journal policies)
wikidata.org
CORE.ac.uk
Semantic Scholar
Google Scholar