BODILY AFFECTS AS PRENOETIC ELEMENTS IN ENACTIVE PERCEPTION release_hjkdoi2iebbirhxxvwpdtxzwky

by Matthew Bower, Shaun Gallagher

Released as a article-journal .

Abstract

keywords Perception, enaction, embodiment, affection, phenomenology in this paper we attempt to advance the enactive discourse on perception by highlighting the role of bodily affects as prenoetic constraints on perceptual experience. enactivists argue for an essential connection between perception and action, where action primarily means skillful bodily intervention in one's surroundings. analyses of sensory-motor contingencies (as in noë 2004) are important contributions to the enactive account. yet this is an incomplete story since sensory-motor contingencies are of no avail to the perceiving agent without motivational pull in one direction or another or a sense of the pertinent affective contingencies. Before directly addressing the issue of affect in perception, we explain our peculiar, low-level conception of affect as a form of world-involving intentionality that modulates (minimally) bodily behavior without necessarily possessing informational value of any kind. We then address the deficiency concerning affect in enactive accounts of perception by examining some exemplary forms of bodily affect that constrain perception. We show that bodily affect significantly contributes to (either limiting or enabling) our contact with the world in our perceptually operative attentive outlook, in a kind of perceptual interest or investment, and in social perception.
In text/plain format

Archived Files and Locations

application/pdf  242.6 kB
file_qd6gztu2ifb67fulp3ajteruem
web.archive.org (webarchive)
www.fupress.net (web)
Read Archived PDF
Preserved and Accessible
Type  article-journal
Stage   unknown
Work Entity
access all versions, variants, and formats of this works (eg, pre-prints)
Catalog Record
Revision: bf6ac96e-6f88-4ab0-b982-41a5145de88f
API URL: JSON