The Truman Administration and China, 1945-1949
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References
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I b i d ., 257; see also, C.I.A. Situation Report, S.R. No. 1/50, p.
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file 77/283A, DDRS.
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C.I.A. Situation Report, S.R. No. 4/50, p. 6, file 77/283D, DDRS. ^See, for example, Memorandum by Mr. John P. Davies, Jr., of the Policy Planning Staff, 24 August 1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 536.
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See, Memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff, 7 September 1948, F.R., 1948, VIII, 148, 153-154. (This PPS memorandum became the con ceptual basis for the NSC 34 series "United States Policy Toward China" which the President approved on 4 February 1949, see, ibid., I47fn; see also. Draft Report by the National Security Council on United States Policy toward China, 2 November 1948, ibid., 185-187; Note by the Execu tive Secretary of the National Security Council to the Council, 11
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January 1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 474-475; Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council to the Council, 4 February 1949, i^. , 484-485.
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Study Prepared by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Paul H. Nitze, 8 February 1950, F.R., 1950, I, 146. 4 On this point of winning the Chinese Communists away from the Soviets, see the comments by the Counselor of the Embassy in China, that the "fundamental" U.S. policy toward China "...should be to prevent China from becoming (a) reenforcement to Soviet power. To achieve this end, we must wait for (the) development of (a) Chinese form of "Titoism", meanwhile doing nothing to encourage (the) growth of (a) strong Commu nist China. Policy of outright hostility toward (the) rulers of China and overt support of subversive activity against them, while it undoubt edly would hinder consolidation (of) CCP power, would be unlikely to contribute toward (the) detachment of China from (the) USSR because it would conflict with, rather than make use of Chinese chauvinism." The Counselor of the Embassy in China, 3 September 1949, in U.S. Dept, of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1978), VIII, 520. Hereafter cited as F.R., 1949, VIII. (This particular memorandum apparently had considerable impact on State Department think ing in Washington. See, Ibid., 521fn; Also, see, George Kennan's comments in, Report by Mr. Charles W. Yost, Special Assistant to the Ambassador-at-Large, 16 September 1949, F.R., 1949, VII, 1206. Draft Report by the National Security Council on United States Policy Regarding Trade with China, 28 February 1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 828.^I bid.. 828.
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Ibid., 828-829. 4bid., 829. Ibid., 829. ^°Ibid., 829. T^Ibid., 830.^I bid., 833-834.
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Ibid., 833; In addressing a meeting of experts on Asia assembled by the State Department in October of 1949, General George C. Marshall, made this comment: "I don't think you can call the Japanese-Chinese trade exactly a "must" but it comes pretty close to being that. We are not going to go on forever providing the goods, the foods, and the money that has been necessary to keep Japan afloat." Minutes of the Meetings of the "Roundtable Discussions" of 6, 7 & 8 October, President's Secre tary Files, Box 174, Truman Papers, HSTL. 14
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Draft Report by the National Security Council on United States Policy Regarding Trade with China, 28 February 1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 833.^^I bid., 833.^M emorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with President Truman, 16 September 1949, ibid., 878; White House dissatis faction over the existing U.S. trade policy with China apparently had begun to develop some time earlier, see. Memorandum by Mr. Livingston T. Merchant of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the Chief of the Divi sion of Chinese Affairs, 24 August 1949, ibid., 870-871.^A s already indicated, this view was always a latent part of American trade policy toward the Chinese Communists. See, for example, W. Walton Butterworth's comments in a conversation with British offi cials in Washington in September of 1949 that one of the essential objectives of U.S. trade policy was, "...to disabuse the Chinese Commu nists of their preconception that western nations are necessarily, by virtue of their capitalist and imperialist societies, bound to accept a passive role in their economic relations with Communist China." Butter- worth went on to argue in favor of a common British American trade policy, "...not with the idea necessarily of arbitrarily preventing the flow of such goods, but as a symbol of our ability to take punitive measures against the Chinese Communists if such action should be made necessary in the future." Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Robert N. Magill of the Division of Chinese Affairs, 9 September 1949, ibid., 872;
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See also, The Counselor of the Embassy in China that "Conciliatory gestures now of (an) economic or diplomatic nature would not only be opposed by (a) large portion of (the) American public but would simply be interpreted by (the) CCP as bearing out (the) Communist theory of (the) inner weakness of (the) USA." The Counselor of the Embassy in China to the Secretary of State, 3 September 1949, F.R., 1949, VIII, 520. (In this memorandum, Clubb reported that Michael Keon, the Austrian journalist who had initially relayed the demarche, had later talked with Chou En-lai's personal secretary who had revealed to Keon that the
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See, for exançle, the series of dispatches in "The Embassy in China After Occupation of Nanking by Chinese Communists", F.R., 1949, VIII, 843-859; See also. Memorandum by Troy L. Perkins of the Office of Chinese Affairs, 5 November 1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 168-170;
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See, also, the series of dispatches, "Evacuations of Americans From China", ibid., 1356-1364.
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Buhite. "Missed Opportunities"; See also. Memorandum by Mr. John
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P. Davies, Jr. of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff, George Kennan, 30 June 1949, F.R., 1949, VIII, 768-769; The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State, 28 June 1949, ibid., 766-767.
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Smith, Dean Acheson, 122.
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Of the more recent volumes in this regard, see, Purifoy, Harry
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Truman's China Policy, McLellan, Acheson: The State Department Years;
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Tang Tsou's seminal work on U.S. China policy during the Truman years assumes that the Administration, despite its preferences, found itself unable to disassociate from the Nationalist Government on Formosa be cause of pro-Chiang Kai-shek pressure from Congress. As a result, Tang Tsou argues, the Administration faced a situation in which it was "impractical" to consider recognition of the Chinese Communists. Tang Tsou, America's Failure, 500-519.
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See, Steele, The American People and China, 35-36.
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See Dean Acheson's comments several years later in. Notes on
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China, 2 July 1953, Princeton Seminars, Acheson Papers, HSTL.^I bid.
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The Charge in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 27 June 1949, F.R., 1949, VIII, 399-400.
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Buhite. "Missed Opportunities".
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The Consul-General at Peiping to the Secretary of State, 18
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August 1949, in U.S. Dept, of State, Foreign Relations (Washington, D.C., 1978), VIII, 496-498; The Consul-General at Shanghai to the Secre tary of State, 14 November 1949, ibid., 592; Memorandum by the Ambassa dor to China to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 28 November 1949, ibid., 612. ^^The Consul-General at Peiping to the Secretary of State, 2 June 1949, ibid., 363.^B uhite. "Missed Opportunities".
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The Consul-General at Shanghai to the Secretary of State, 30 June 1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 1263.^I bid.. 1263.^F or a documentary overview of the steady increase in Chinese Communist induced restrictions on all private American activity in China in 1949 and 1950 and the consequent decline of American influence in this regard see the section on "Evacuation of Americans in China," ibid., 1210-1364.^F or a documentary overview of increasing Communist restrictions placed on all American Embassy and consulate activities in China in 1949 and 1950 see sections "The Embassy in China after occupation of Nanking by Chinese Communists"; "Increasing difficulties of the Consulate at Dairen due to actions of Soviet and Chinese Communist authorities";
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"Problems of United States Consulates in areas occupied by the Chinese Communists," F.R., 1949, VIII, 723-1327.
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See, for example. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul- General at Peiping, 14 June 1949, ibid., 384-385, 384fn.; The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Peiping, 22 March 1950, F.R., 1950, VI, 321-322. 53 For documentation on this episode, see, F.R., 1949, VIII, 1199- 1222. 54 For documentation on detention of the American consulate in Mukden in 1948 and 1949, see "Problems of United States Consulates in areas occupied by the Chinese Communists: Mukden Consulate General", ibid., 933-1051; For a concise "history" of the Mukden episode, see. The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations, 10 November 1949, ibid., 1007-1008; As to the nature of the impact of the Mukden situation on the issue of United States-Chinese Communist relations, see also. Notes on China, 22 and 23 July 1953, Princeton Seminars, Acheson Papers, HSTL.^M emorandum by the Under Secretary of State on a meeting with the President, 14 November 1949, F.R., 1949, VIII, 1008.^M emorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, 18 November 1949, ibid., 1011-1013; The State Department also opposed a blockade on the grounds that it would not have any appreciable impact on the Chinese economy; it would give the commu nists a propaganda leverage; it could not be applied legally against the *°Ibid., 349-350.
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G llb id ., 351.^I b i d . , 351.
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P rin c e to n Sem inars, Acheson P a p e rs, HSTL.
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