Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations
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by
Elbridge A. Colby, Michael S. Gerson
References
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See, for example, Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Stability Recon- sidered," Daedalus, Vol. 109, No. 4, Fall 1980, pp. 135-54.
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See, for example, Colin Powell, prepared statement to the hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate on "Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction," S.
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HRG. 107-622, July 9, 2002, available from www.access.gpo.gov/con- gress/senate/senate11sh107.html; Camille Grand, "Ballistic Missile Threats, Missile Defenses, Deterrence, and Strategic Stability," International Perspectives on Missile Proliferation and Defenses, Oc- casional Paper 5, Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute for Interna- tional Studies, 2001, pp. 5-11, available from cns.miis.edu/opapers/ op5/op5.pdf; Thérèse Delpeche, "Nuclear Weapons-Less Central, More Dangerous?" in Burkard Schmitt, ed., Nuclear Weapons: A New Great Debate, Challiot Papers 48, Paris, France: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 2001, pp. 14-22, avail- able from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp048e.pdf; Thomas Scheber, "Strategic Stability: Time for a Reality Check," Interna- tional Journal, Vol. 63, No. 4, Autumn 2008, pp. 893-915.
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Edward L. Warner, remarks on "How is Deterrence and Stability Enhanced/Diminished by Arms Control Beyond New Start?" 2011 United States Strategic Command Deterrence Sym- posium, Omaha, NE, August 3-4, 2011, available from www. stratcom.mil/video/deterrence/67/Panel_2_-_How_is_deterrence_and_ stability_enhanceddiminished_by_arms_control_bey/. poses of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are be- ing realised," available fromwww.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/ Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf. 10. Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, signed and entered into force May 25, 1972, available from www.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm. 11. NPT, supra, from the Preamble.
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See, e.g., President Barack Obama, remarks in Prague, April 5, 2009, available from www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0904/ doc10.htm. 13. Christopher A. Ford, "Why Not Nuclear Disarmament?" The New Atlantis, Spring 2010, quoting foreign diplomat, avail- able from www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/why-not-nuclear- disarmament.
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See, e.g., Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966, pp. 92-125, discussing risk manipulation in NATO nuclear strategy and other contexts. 15. See David Shambaugh, China's Communist Party, Wash- ington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 208, at 177-178, cit- ing Lieberthal and using concepts in understanding the Chinese Communist Party's adaptation to changing circumstances. 16. See generally, e.g., Russ Marion, The Edge of Organization: Chaos and Complexity Theories of Formal Social Systems, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999, pp. 162, 167-169.
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See Christopher A. Ford, "Playing for Time on the Edge of the Apocalypse: Maximizing Decision Time for Nuclear Lead- ers," George P. Shultz et al., eds., Deterrence: Its Past and Future, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2011, pp. 217, 238-240.
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Scott Sagan's analysis of nuclear weapons accident risk reduc- tion also owes much to such a framework, though he does not explicitly use the language of Complexity Science. See, e.g., Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991, pp. 264-278, discussing Charles Perrow's "normal 62. Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960, p. 230. 63. Ford, "Nuclear Weapons Reconstitution and its Discon- tents," supra, pp. 149-50.
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Schelling, supra, p. 127. 65. See generally Christopher Ford, "Misinterpreting the NPT," remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 30, 2011, critiquing views advanced by Daniel Joyner in Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011, available from www.newpara- digmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=1100. For an alternative to the proliferation-facilitating interpretation of the NPT's technology- transfer provisions, see Ford, "Nuclear Technology Rights and Wrongs," supra. 66. START, supra, Art. XV. 67. New START, supra, Part Six.
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Ford & Feith, supra, p. 2. 69. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Repub- lic of China, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2010, p. 1, available from www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_ Final.pdf.
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See Amy Butler, John M. Doyle, and Michal Bruno, "Many Issues Still Unaddressed by Gates," Aviation Week & Space Technol- ogy, January 2, 2009, available from www.aviationweek.com, quot- ing Gates that "I'd begin to get pretty nervous if we begin to talk about below 1,500 [deployed U.S. warheads] just in view of the array of countries developing these systems and modernization programs in both Russia and China." 71. See, e.g., Christopher Ford, "The Treaty After Next?" re- marks to the working group of the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 6, 2010, 1. John Spanier, Games Nation Play, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1984, pp. 95-96. See also John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
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Philip Windsor, Strategic Thinking-an Introduction and Fare- well, London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, pp. 117-118. 3. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Lisbon Summit Dec- laration Issued by the Heads of State and Governments partici- pating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon," November 20, 2010, p. 1.
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Dorn Crawford, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)-A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements, Washington: U.S. Department of State, March 2009, p. 2. 5. Ibid., p. 5.
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Schuler Foerster, William Barry, William Clontz, and Harold Lynch, Defining Stability-Conventional Arms Control in a Changing Europe, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989, p. 5. 7. Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, signed in Paris, France, May 27, 1997, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_ texts_25468.htm.
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Zdzislaw Lachowski, "The CFE Treaty One Year After Its Suspension: A Forlorn Treaty?" SIPRI Policy Brief, January 2009, p. 1. 9. Ibid., p. 4.
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Wade Boese, "Russia Unflinching on CFE Treaty Suspen- sion," Arms Control Today, May 2008. 11. Ibid. 12. NATO Public Diplomacy Division, "Press Release-Lis- bon Summit Declaration," Brussels, Belgium: NATO Public Af- fairs, November 20, 2010, p. 9. 13. "Russia Says Consultation on Talks on Conventional Forces Treaty in Impasse," Interfax, July 4, 2011. 14. Victoria Nuland, "Implementation of the Treaty on Con- ventional Armed Forces in Europe," Washington, DC: Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, November 22, 2011. 15. "UK Halts Military Data Sharing with Russia,"
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Ria Novosti, November 25, 2011, available from en.rian.ru/ world/20111125/169036481.html. 16. Nuland. 17. "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germa- ny," NATO Review, No. 5, October 1990, pp. 30-32. 18. Ibid. 19. U.S. Department of State, "Fact Sheet-Treaty on Con- ventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Key Facts About the Current Treaty and Agreement on Adaptation," Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2009. 20. Evgeny Morozov, "What do They Teach at the Krem- lin School of Bloggers," Foreign Policy website, available from neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/26/what_do_they_teach_at_ kremlins_school_of_bloggers.
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Sherman Garnett, "The CFE Flank Agreement," Wash- ington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997, p. 1. 22. Lachowski, p. 6. This view was underscored by senior Georgian officials during discussions in Tbilisi, Georgia, in De- cember 2010. 23. Some force planners might argue that this could provide the West with certain advantages. Still the absence of the Baltic re- 1. Steven Pifer, Nuclear Arms Control in 2012, Washing- ton, DC: Brookings Institute, January 19, 2012, available from www.brookings.edu/speeches/2012/0119_arms_control_pifer.aspx.
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Ian Kearns, Beyond the United Kingdom: Trends in the Other Nuclear Armed States, Washington, DC: British American Securi- ty Information Council (BASIC), November 2011, p. 8, available from www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/commission-briefing1.pdf. 3. Ibid.
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Alexander Dynkin et al., "Strategic Stability After the Cold War," paper presented at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) conference, "Strategic Stability After the Cold War," Moscow, 2010, p. 6. 5. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
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Dmitry Medvedev, "Meeting with participants in the Mu- nich conference on Security Policy," available from eng.kremlin. ru/news/1173. 14. Excerpt from Lavrov's speech:
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So [the] missile defense situation is the crux of the matter of in- divisibility of security . . . this remains, I think, the single irrita- tor of considerable importance in Russian-American relations. . . . We do hope that we can overcome it and will be, as Russia, doing anything we can to achieve a fairer view which would be based on equality, respect of the interest of each other and the respect for the security concerns of each other.
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Sergei Lavrov, "Russia in a Multipolar World: Implications for Russia-EU-U.S. Relations," Speech at the Russian Em- bassy in Washington, DC, July 12, 2011, available from www. europeaninstitute.org/images/stories/programs/lavrov.remarks.pdf. 15. "Russia 'disappointed' by U.S. failure to provide missile guarantees," RIA Novosti, May 16, 2011, available from en.rian.ru/ russia/20110516/164052008.html. 16. Cullison Alan: "Russia Considers Blocking NATO Sup- ply Routes," The Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2011, available from online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577066421 106592452.html?mod=wsj_share_tweet. 17. Excerpt from leaked cable sent from U.S. Embassy in Mos- cow. "Russian Duma Members Want US-Russia Relations Based On Trust And Dialogue," February 22, 2010, available from www. cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10MOSCOW391&q=defense%20 missile. 18. "Односторонние же шаги наших партнёров, не учитывающие мнения России и её интересы, получат соответствующую оценку и нашу ответную реакцию" ("Steps taken by our partners which are unilateral and fail to take into account Russia's opinions and interests will receive an appro- priate evaluation and a reaction in kind"), from Vladimir Putin, "Сильная Россия в сложном мире" ("A Strong Russia in a Com- plex World"), available from www.putin2012.ru/program/6. 27. A. V. Makarin and A. I. Strebkov, "Война и военная политика" ("War and Military Politics"), Теория и история политических институтов (Theory and History of Political Insti- tutions), St. Petersburg, Russia: St. Petersburg University Press, 2008. Russian leaders have often stressed the necessity of national unity and strength throughout history: ". . . [T]he lesson that internecine conflict invites foreign incur- sion and that only unity, extending from princes to the people as a whole, ensures victory has become a constant of Russian military lore. . . . Today, the lesson holds firm, enshrined in such prominent venues as the 2003 three-volume military history of Russia, sponsored by the Ministry of Defense, or in the first vol- ume of the massive thirty-volume project, The Military History of the Russian State. . .
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History Done Right: War and the Dynamics of Triumphalism in Contemporary Russian Culture
Gregory Carleton 2011 Slavic Review: Interdisciplinary Quarterly of Russian, Eurasian, and East European Studies doi:10.5612/slavicreview.70.3.0615 | |
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Alexander Dynkin et al., "Strategic Stability After the Cold War," paper presented at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) conference, "Strategic Stability After the Cold War," Moscow, 2010, p. 14.
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Alexei Arbatov, Gambit or Endgame? The New State of Arms Control, Moscow, Russia: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2011, pp. 5; the actual text of the doctrine reads: "The Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weap- ons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat." See Carnegie Endowment, "Text of New- ly-Approved Russian Military Doctrine," available from www. carnegieendowment.org/2010/02/05/text-of-newly-approved-russian- military-doctrine/l8t. 30. Arbatov 2011, p. 5. 31. Nuclear Posture Review Report, Washington, DC: Depart- ment of Defense, April 2010, pp. 15, 55.
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Alexander Dynkin et al., "Non-Nuclear Factors of Nuclear Disarmament: Ballistic Missile Defense, High-Precision Conven- tional Weapons, Space Arms," paper presented at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) confer- ence, "Missile Defense, Non-Proliferation and Deep Reduction of Nuclear Weapons," Moscow, 2010, p. 58. 33. Arbatov, 2011, p.10.
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Dmitri Trenin, Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story, Wash- ington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011, p. 143.
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Alexei Fenenko: "The cyclical nature of Russian-American relations," RIA Novosti, June 21, 2011, available from en.rian.ru/ valdai_op/20110621/164739508.html. 36. President Dmitry Medvedev, Interview with Russian me- dia officials, August 31, 2008, available from archive.kremlin.ru/ eng/speeches/2008/08/31/1850_type82912type82916_206003.shtml. 37. General Viktor Yesin, Interview with author, June 2011.
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James Acton, Deterrence During Disarmament: Deep Nuclear Reductions and International Security, New York: International In- stitute for Strategic Studies-Routledge, 2011, p. 64. 39. As one American scholar explained, "'Unacceptable dam- age' to the Soviet Union was variously defined by former Secre- tary of Defense Robert S. McNamara as requiring the ability to destroy a fifth to a fourth of its population and a half to two-thirds of its industrial capacity," from Kenneth N. Waltz, "Peace, Stabil- ity, and Nuclear Weapons," Washington, DC: Institute on Glob- al Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, August 1995, p. 10. 40. As noted in a 1995 Foreign Affairs article, "Russia's econ- omy has deteriorated to the point where officers have to work off-duty as farmhands to make ends meet. . . . Russian soldiers in and around Chechnya lack adequate clothing, rations, and shel- ter." Benjamin S. Lambeth: "Russia's Wounded Military," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 2, March-April 1995, p. 91; for a closer look 53. Pavel Podvig: "Russia's Nuclear Forces: Between Disarma- ment and Modernization," Proliferation Papers, No. 37, Spring 2011, available from www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=6649&id_ provenance=97.
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