LYING IS A KIND OF DECEPTION / (MENTIRA É UM TIPO DE ENGANAÇÃO)
release_drnmt6zmibcwrfd5vsjv4w4h5a
by
Felipe Castelo Branco MEDEIROS (PUCRS)
2018 Volume 10, Issue 23, p42-55
Abstract
Under the traditional view of lying, the concept is usually taken to be a deviant speech act with the following characteristics: (1) being insincere and (2) being done with the intention to deceive. On the recent literature, however, (2) has come under attack by a class of counter examples that purport to show that the traditional view has been misguided. In this essay, our objective is twofold, we intend to: (a) present Lackey's defense of her take on the traditional conception; (b) present a different proposal about how to go about defending (2). This is important because, although we don't agree with Lackey's solution, we do agree that (2) is a necessary condition on a successful definition of lying, as evidenced by the fact that taking the deception clause out of [lying] leaves us with an overall loss of explanatory power with regards to a range of speech acts and the general ethics of communicative cooperation.
In application/xml+jats
format
Archived Files and Locations
application/pdf 257.6 kB
file_5k73av5pxfbedo4yn5is3dbcqm
|
www2.marilia.unesp.br (publisher) web.archive.org (webarchive) |
article-journal
Stage
published
Date 2018-07-28
access all versions, variants, and formats of this works (eg, pre-prints)
Crossref Metadata (via API)
Worldcat
SHERPA/RoMEO (journal policies)
wikidata.org
CORE.ac.uk
Semantic Scholar
Google Scholar