Les crashs sont rationnels release_amcmjyf4tnevxi6dn426vtphli

by Pierre Lescanne

Released as a article .

2012  

Abstract

As we show by using notions of equilibrium in infinite sequential games, crashes or financial escalations are rational for economic or environmental agents, who have a vision of an infinite world. This contradicts a picture of a self-regulating, wise and pacific economic world. In other words, in this context, equilibrium is not synonymous of stability. We try to draw, from this statement, methodological consequences and new ways of thinking, especially in economic game theory. Among those new paths, coinduction is the basis of our reasoning in infinite games.
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Type  article
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Date   2012-01-08
Version   v4
Language   en ?
arXiv  1111.7299v4
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