Obligations of Conscience release_a4hegfu2nzaxrdk36ntbokzoee

Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> In this paper, I outline and defend a commonly-held moral view which has received surprisingly little sustained philosophical attention. This view, which I call the 'authority of conscience,' states that believing ourselves to have moral obligations to act in a certain way does in fact create an obligation to act in that way. Although I do not provide a positive case for the principle of authoritative conscience, beyond its popularity and intuitive force, I defend it against several <jats:italic>prima facie</jats:italic> objections. I then go on to demonstrate that the principle does not entail any anti-realist metaethical commitments, and is therefore compatible in particular, and contrary to appearances, with plausible formulations of moral realism.
In application/xml+jats format

Archived Files and Locations