Prisoner's Dilemma in One-Dimensional Cellular Automata: Visualization of Evolutionary Patterns release_7cp4q7pgn5f3bhm6mpzl5qbpim

by Marcelo Alves Pereira, Alexandre Souto Martinez, Aquino Lauri Espindola

Released as a article .

2007  

Abstract

The spatial Prisoner's Dilemma is a prototype model to show the emergence of cooperation in very competitive environments. It considers players, at site of lattices, that can either cooperate or defect when playing the Prisoner's Dilemma with other z players. This model presents a rich phase diagram. Here we consider players in cells of one-dimensional cellular automata. Each player interacts with other z players. This geometry allows us to vary, in a simple manner, the number of neighbors ranging from one up to the lattice size, including self-interaction. This approach has multiple advantages. It is simple to implement numerically and we are able to retrieve all the previous results found in the previously considered lattices, with a faster convergence to stationary values. More remarkable, it permits us to keep track of the spatio-temporal evolution of each player of the automaton. Giving rise to interesting patterns. These patterns allow the interpretation of cooperation/defection clusters as particles, which can be absorbed and collided among themselves. The presented approach represents a new paradigm to study the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma.
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Type  article
Stage   submitted
Date   2007-08-27
Version   v1
Language   en ?
arXiv  0708.3520v1
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