Does Changing Electoral Systems Affect (Corrupt) Particularistic Exchanges? Evidence from the Italian Case release_73mpgnhgtrdnlbfeanaqcwgzoq

by Simona Piattoni, MATTEO GIGLIOLI

Published in Politics and Governance by Cogitatio.

2020   p78

Abstract

The literature on forms of particularism explores the impact of institutional variables on what is denoted, alternatively, as constituency service, pork-barrel politics, or corruption. Attention has mostly been given to electoral systems, but other institutional provisions and political factors, such as party strength, are also relevant. The present contribution investigates the likely effects of electoral reforms on corruption control and seeks confirmation of the hypothesis that single member plurality (even within mixed member) systems are conducive to a type of particularism that might help fight corruption, taking Italy as a case. We test the impact of two electoral reforms and three electoral systems enacted in Italy between 1996 and 2016, whose primary aim was bolstering enfeebled party leaderships and facilitating the formation of durable governments, and we compare the effort at corruption control of the Italian governments born under these different electoral systems with those of other European democracies.
In application/xml+jats format

Archived Files and Locations

application/pdf  658.9 kB
file_73jjkad66rcv3lfpnwirxbxmye
www.cogitatiopress.com (publisher)
web.archive.org (webarchive)
Read Archived PDF
Preserved and Accessible
Type  article-journal
Stage   published
Date   2020-05-28
Container Metadata
Open Access Publication
In DOAJ
In Keepers Registry
ISSN-L:  2183-2463
Work Entity
access all versions, variants, and formats of this works (eg, pre-prints)
Catalog Record
Revision: a0e96c23-9c1f-4c27-b274-6b1b4453f151
API URL: JSON