Strength Is Still a Weakness in Coalition Formation: Replicating and Understanding the Strength-Is-Weakness Effect release_4l6sqhkeifagrhxfskdswikxby

by Joeri Wissink, Ilja van Beest, Tila Pronk, Niels van de Ven

Published in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin by SAGE Publications.

2021   Volume 48, Issue 2, p014616722110058

Abstract

A key observation in coalition formation is that bargainers with most resources are often excluded from coalitions: the Strength-is-Weakness effect. Previous studies have suffered from low sample sizes and lack of (appropriate) incentives and have rarely focused on underlying processes. To address these issues, we conducted a cross-platform replication using the Online Coalition Game. We replicated the Strength-is-Weakness effect in a psychology laboratory, on Amazon Mechanical Turk, and on Prolific. Moreover, our results showed that the equity norm shapes the Strength-is-Weakness effect in two ways. First, strong bargainers claim a higher larger of the payoffs than weak bargainers do, making them less attractive coalition partners. Second, weak bargainers expect strong bargainers to make these larger claims, directing weak bargainers to each other from the outset. Finally, the studies suggest that the Online Coalition Game is a viable tool for conducting high-powered coalition formation research.
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