Towards a Lightweight Continuous Authentication Protocol for Device-to-Device Communication
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by
Syed W. Shah, Naeem F. Syed, Arash Shaghaghi, Adnan Anwar, Zubair Baig, Robin Doss
2020
Abstract
Continuous Authentication (CA) has been proposed as a potential solution to
counter complex cybersecurity attacks that exploit conventional static
authentication mechanisms that authenticate users only at an ingress point.
However, widely researched human user characteristics-based CA mechanisms
cannot be extended to continuously authenticate Internet of Things (IoT)
devices. The challenges are exacerbated with increased adoption of
device-to-device (d2d) communication in critical infrastructures. Existing d2d
authentication protocols proposed in the literature are either prone to
subversion or are computationally infeasible to be deployed on constrained IoT
devices. In view of these challenges, we propose a novel, lightweight, and
secure CA protocol that leverages communication channel properties and a
tunable mathematical function to generate dynamically changing session keys.
Our preliminary informal protocol analysis suggests that the proposed protocol
is resistant to known attack vectors and thus has strong potential for
deployment in securing critical and resource-constrained d2d communication.
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